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Abstract: States differ in the extent to which they give their constitutions rigidity. Exploring 
constitutional amendment methods in 21 small island democracies with plurality elections, this 
study  aims  at  explaining  such  rigidity  differences.  The  leading  expectation  is  that  rigid 
amendment  dominates  in  countries  which  have  experienced  in  their  political  life 
disproportionate dominance in terms of party politics or excessive social fragmentation. These 
countries, namely, have probably internalized a need to ward off by means of high amendment 
thresholds  sudden  constitutional  replacement,  which  is  one  possible  consequence  of  the 
plurality election method. A main empirical finding is that a pattern of positive co-variance 
certainly exists. Whenever the triggering factors (dominance/fragmentation) are at hand, rigid 
amendment follows; whenever the factors are not at hand, moderate amendment follows. The 
finding  strongly  supports  an  image  of  small  islands  as  thoughtful  and  purposeful  political 
actors that design their political institutions to reflect their particular needs.   
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Introduction 
The point of departure of this investigation is an observation made by Arend Lijphart in 1999 
in his well-known treatise on Patterns of Democracy. In this book Lijphart examines political 
institutions  from  the  perspective  of  how  majoritarian  or  how  consensual  their  rules  and 
practices are; one of the several institutions that are incorporated in his classification concerns 
constitutional amendment. While Lijphart finds that “democracies use a bewildering array of 
devices to give their constitutions different degree of rigidity” (1999: 218), he still argues that 
the great variety of provisions can in fact be reduced to a few basic types, namely flexible 
amendment by ordinary majority; or rigid amendment by two-thirds majorities, by less than 
two-thirds  majority  but  more  than  an  ordinary  majority,  and  by  more  than  a  two-thirds 
majority,  such  as  the  three-fourths  majority  (1999:  219).  As  evident  from  comparative 
investigations into the general patterns in the world of amendment, flexible amendment is rare 
and the exception, whereas rigid amendment is the rule (e.g. Anckar & Karvonen, 2002). The 
interesting variation, therefore, appears to be between different rigid forms of amendment, and 
the observation by Lijphart that is of interest here pertains to exactly this division.  
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Discussing  specifically  the  case  of  Barbados,  Lijphart  emphasizes  the  decisive  role  for 
amendment choice of the electoral system. In parliaments elected by plurality, so the argument 
goes, large majorities often represent much smaller popular majorities and sometimes even 
merely a popular majority. Moreover, these large parliamentary majorities are often single-
party  majorities.  It  follows,  then,  that  majorities  that  are  large  enough  to  force  through 
constitutional change in fact represent rather narrow population segments or political interests. 
Lijphart notes that while two-thirds majorities are required for amending the constitution of 
Barbados, in three of seven elections since 1966 such large one-party majorities were in fact 
manufactured from between 50 and 60 percent of the popular votes (1999: 219-220).  Indeed, 
in a number of cases in the English speaking  Caribbean ruling parties have possessed the 
capacity to change or replace the constitution unilaterally without opposition votes – according 
to a fairly recent count, on at least thirteen occasions since independence, the first placed party 
has won 100 per cent of the seats in the parliament (Griner, 2005 quoted in Elkins & Ginsburg, 
2011:  16).  This  shows  how  supermajorities  in  plurality  systems  are  clearly  much  less 
constraining than the same supermajorities in proportional systems, and Lijphart (1999: 220-
221) suggests that this has been recognized in at least some plurality countries that require 
three-fourths parliamentary majorities for constitutional amendment.  
Lijphart’s proposal is rationalistic in nature, as it looks upon institutions as ‘problem-solvers’, 
to make use of a term from an exposition by Jean Laponce and Bernard Saint-Jacques (1997). 
The proposal adheres to the view that constitutions and institutions are designed to serve the 
particular needs of the societies over which they have legal and political authority; in the cases 
at hand, these particular needs emanate from electoral mechanisms and the political power 
structure. The problem which needs to be solved is about domination; this study sets out to 
clarify whether or not it is true that plurality entities really employ amendment thresholds to 
counteract  threats  and  challenges  that  follow  from  disproportionate  dominance.  However, 
several rather tricky methodological problems must be solved before the investigation may be 
effected.  First,  a  set  of  countries  must  be  identified  which  satisfy  proper  criteria  for  case 
selection;  second,  the  factor  or  factors  that  are  regarded  as  independent  variables  and  are 
accordingly taken to trigger a rational choice between rigid and very rigid amendment must be 
identified  and  operationalized;  third,  the  technique  for  empirically  establishing  amendment 
thresholds  as  dependent  variables  must  be  decided.  Finally,  the  co-variation  between 
independent and dependent factors must be established and commented upon. The remainder 
of this article has four separate sections which follow in terms of ambition and presentation the 
above division. 
The Research Population 
Concerning the choice of countries to be studied, two demarcations are obvious. The countries 
must  be  democracies,  and  they  must  have  plurality-based  electoral  systems.  The  second 
requirement is of course self-evident, as it follows from the very design of the study; the first 
requirement is no less obvious. Non-democracies must be disregarded because the functions of 
constitutions and, in consequence, the motives for introducing amendments may be assumed to 
be  somewhat  different  in  non-democratic  than  in  democratic  contexts  (Derbyshire  & 
Derbyshire,  1999:  16).  Above  all,  the  very  tension  between  majority  will  and  minority 
protection that is embedded in the democratic way of structuring government and is the target 
for the choice of amendment methods is not at issue to the same extent in non-democratic                                                          Constitutional Amendments in Small Island Democracies 
  3
entities,  which  maintain  a  weaker  commitment  to  popular  sovereignty.  In  short:  only  in 
democratic settings may disproportionalities of electoral systems produce real power changes 
and new power positions; therefore, the focus  must in this investigation be on democratic 
countries. 
Furthermore, it is desirable that the investigation focus on small island states. This is for one 
main reason. The critical combination of democratic status and plural elections is frequent in 
the small island states family (e.g. Anckar, 2011; Lundell, 2005), and the population to be 
studied here must therefore in any case include a majority of such entities. This being the case, 
and since it is a major goal in research design to decrease or control as much as possible the 
influence of extraneous or nuisance variables (Peters, 1998: 8-9), it follows that the research 
population shall preferably be kept constant in terms of size and size-related factors as well as 
islandness and islandness-related factors. If this is not done, the risk is that variations in these 
factors may unduly influence the mental and other mechanisms that form the relation between 
what  is  to  explain  (dominance)  and  what  is  to  be  explained  (amendment).  For  instance, 
Stephen Royle argues in his impressive A Geography of Islands that isolation and boundedness 
are two factors that make islands special (2001: 11). When and if the argument is valid, and it 
certainly makes sense to postulate that island communities are characterized by boundedness, 
any inclusion of non-island units serves to introduce elements of non-boundedness into the 
analytical framework. This is unfortunate, as boundedness, obviously, may be regarded as an 
intervening  factor  that  moulds  mental  orientations  and  thereby  affects  ways  of  perceiving 
dominance threats as well as the necessity to develop methods to ward of such threats. 
Still  one  consideration  must  be  introduced  which  affects  the  composition  of  the  research 
population. For any given state, definition issues of democracy and size as well as explanatory 
issues must be decided on the basis of the situation that prevailed approximately at the time of 
the adoption of the relevant constitution or shortly before the adoption. This is for obvious 
methodological  reasons:  the  choice  of  an  institutional  arrangement  being  the  dependent 
variable,  measurements  of  independent  variables,  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  causal 
reasoning, must precede or coincide with the choice in question in terms of time. This carries 
two kinds of consequences. First, since the provisions that are studied here are included in the 
constitutions that are valid presently, and since these constitutions are from different points of 
time, time-dependent consequences for the research design will follow. For example, Jamaica, 
Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago must be included in the population – these states are no 
longer today microstates, but were in that category  when they  adopted  their independence 
constitutions by means of which they are still governed and the contents of which in terms of 
amendment is scrutinized here. Second, other states have since independence introduced new 
constitutions, and as this in some instances imply that conditions for an admission into the 
research population are now satisfied, time-dependent consequences again follow. Transitions 
from authoritarian to democratic rule have made it possible to include Fiji (1997 constitution) 
and Sao Tomé and Príncipe (2003 constitution) in the population – admittedly, the return in 
Fiji to democratic rule in the late 1990s was regrettably of short duration (e.g. Lal, 2007). 
The preliminary set of countries to be considered here, then, consists of the democratic small 
island states of the world with plural elections, democratic status being defined in terms of 
Freedom House classifications (Anckar, 2011:  54-57), small size being defined in terms of 
populations of less than one million, and both definitions applying to the situation when the D. Anckar 
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actual constitution was installed. Several small island states, like Bahrain, Maldives or Tonga, 
do not satisfy the democracy criterion; others, like Cyprus, Iceland or Malta, do not satisfy the 
plurality election criterion. Upon weeding-out, there remain in the population a total of 21 
states. They are listed in Table 2, and their regional domicile certainly validates the saying that 
islands are distributed across the globe but this distribution is far from even (Royle, 2001: 25-
41). Whereas eleven cases are in the Caribbean family of islands and eight in the Pacific Ocean 
family of islands, the two remaining cases are in the African region.  
The Independent Variables 
Given the point of departure for this essay, dominance is to be evaluated here on the basis of 
the nature of the party system, and the expectation is, to repeat, that countries with dominant 
party systems have as a rule opted for a powerful constraint in the form of the three quarters 
threshold.  Concerning  the  extent  of  dominance,  as  Giovanni  Sartori  has  pointed  out,  the 
general idea is clear enough: whenever one finds in a polity a party that outdistances all the 
others, this party is dominant in that it is significantly stronger than the others (1976: 193). The 
expression “significantly stronger” may of course be operationalized in a variety of ways; for 
instance, Sartori himself assumes that about 10 percentage points of difference between the 
stronger and the other parties suffices to qualify a party as dominant (1976: 193-194). Here, a 
somewhat more demanding conception of dominance is applied: for a party to be dominant, the 
classification basis is a repeated two-thirds or a close to two-thirds parliamentary majority, i.e. 
a majority position from which may follow a capability for the dominant party to initiate and 
force constitutional change.    
When this reasoning is applied to the cases at hand, four Caribbean countries evidently appear 
as representatives for the domination category. The Bahamas gained independence in 1973, 
and the Progressive Liberal Party won the 1968 elections with 29 seats in a 38-seat Assembly, 
the main rival, the United Bahamian party subsequently collapsing, and the Progressive Liberal 
Party  receiving  another  firm  vote  of  confidence  at  the  1972  general  election.  Bahamas  is 
clearly a dominance case. The same is true of St Lucia, independent in 1979 and dominated up 
to that date by the United Workers Party, which won the election in 1964 and governed until 
1979.  Dominica  became  independent  in  1978,  and  was since  1961  ruled  by  the  Dominica 
Labour Party, which after elections in 1975 held a total of 16 out of 21 elected seats in the 
House  of  Assembly.  Furthermore,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  independent  in  1962,  is  in  the 
dominance  camp.  The  politics  of  that  country,  divided  along  ethnicity  lines,  was  up  to 
independence  and  after  clearly  dominated  by  The  People’s  National  Movement  under  the 
leadership of Eric Williams, which gained 20 out of 30 seats in the 1961 election and 24 out of 
36 seats in the 1966 elections (Catón, 2005: 642). Concerning other countries with political 
parties  and  party  systems,  no  similar  dominance  patterns  emerge.  Jamaica,  for  instance, 
experienced before independence power-sharing between the Jamaica Labour Party and the 
People’s National Party  (Wüst, 2005: 423), and in St Kitts-Nevis, independent in 1983, the 
1980  elections  brought  about  the  first  change  in  government  since  1952  (Hillebrands  & 
Schwehm,  2005:  570).  Because  of  oscillation  between  leading  parties  (Baukhage  & 
Hillebrands,  2005:  309-310),  the  Caribbean  case  of  Grenada,  independent  in  1974,  is 
somewhat  difficult  to  decide.  With  some  hesitation,  Grenada  is  here  assigned  to  the  non-
dominance group.                                                          Constitutional Amendments in Small Island Democracies 
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Measures of party strength and party competition, however, cannot be applied in all small 
island cases: not all cases have experienced political party systems and party government since 
independence.  Democracies  without  parties  at  independence  are  Belau,  Kiribati,  Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, Nauru and Tuvalu (Anckar & Anckar, 2000). For the purposes of this 
study Samoa is in the same group, as the first political party appeared only in 1979 (Lewis & 
Sagar, 1992: 345), long after the country gained its independence in 1962 and adopted its first 
constitution. Still in the first times after independence a large proportion of MP’s in Samoa 
were elected unopposed in their constituencies or by the traditional way of village discussions 
(So’o, 2001: 781). Furthermore, the Solomon Islands are a similar case, as the party system 
was still very rudimentary and undeveloped when the country became independent in 1978 
(Alasia, 1989).  For these eight countries, then, an alternative operationalization is needed, the 
implication of which is that these countries may be expected to require because of other and 
different structural or situational circumstances a particular uneasiness or even aversion to the 
origin of a dominance situation.  
The alternative operationalization that is tried out here is about excessive fragmentation. The 
expectation is that countries which are divided into competing and perhaps even hostile ethnic, 
language  and  religious  segments  will  display  an  inclination  to  maintain  a  three-fourths 
amendment threshold. This is because these countries face, due to the particularities of the 
electoral system, the unpleasant eventuality that some of the segments may reach a power 
position which makes it possible to force a moderate constitutional amendment threshold. If 
particular  animosities  prevail  between  the  segments,  the  dread  of  power  alterations  will 
increase, as will the inclination to establish and preserve rigid amendment. The presidential 
election  method  in  the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia  and  the  motives  for  adopting  this 
particular method serves as a good illustration of the mental dispositions, doubts and caution 
that are at play here. Although the political system of Micronesia is presidential in nature, the 
President  is  not  popularly  elected  as  in  other  presidential  democracies,  but  is  elected  by 
Congress among the members that represent the state level. This deviation from a common 
pattern was introduced to lessen the possibility that a President will be elected solely because 
the single largest state has overwhelming electoral power (Burdick, 1988: 266-267; Hanlon & 
Eperiam, 1988: 93-94). 
To decide empirically the level of fragmentation in the respective countries, use is made of an 
available listing, which reports for every country in the world three indices of fragmentation 
(Anckar et al., 2002). These indices are about ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation, 
and the list also combines these measures into an index of total fragmentation, which adds to 
the  value  for  religious  fragmentation  the  dimension  of  ethnicity  or  language,  which  ever 
returns the higher value (ibid.: 6). For the purposes of this study, the ethnic fragmentation 
index and the total fragmentation index come to use; since the separate indices run on a scale 
from  0  to  1,  it  follows  that  the  maximum  value  in  regards  to  ethnicity  is  1.00,  while  the 
maximum total fragmentation value is 2.00. The respective fragmentation values for the eight 
before-mentioned countries are given in Table 1; for the sake of comparison average values for 
all 21 countries are also inserted in the Table. Findings are that Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau 
stand out as evident fragmentation cases. Concerning fragmentation in Micronesia, it should be 
added  that  secession  was  a  major  issue  during  the  Convention  that  contemplated  the 
constitution  of  the  country  and  that  secessionist  sentiments  were  still  frequent  in  the  time 
immediately  preceding  independence  (Burdick,  1988:  261-263).  Concerning  Palau,  an D. Anckar 
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animosity  between  parts  of  the  country  is  likewise  in  the  picture:  “Belauan  politics  is 
characterized by a long and rich tradition of clan, village and regional rivalry”, it is said in one 
characterization from the late 1980s of the country (Quimby, 1988: 111). The very high total 
fragmentation value of Solomon Islands places this country also in the fragmentation camp. In 
contrast,  the  remaining  cases  of  Kiribati,  Marshall  Islands,  Samoa  and  Tuvalu  are  below 
average and are therefore classified as non-fragmented. 
Table 1: Ethnic and Total Fragmentation in 21 Democratic Small Island States (mean 
value), and in a Corresponding Set of Eight States with Undeveloped Party Systems. 
  Ethnic Fragmentation  Total Fragmentation 
Mean Value  for 21 States  0.29  0.76 
Kiribati  0.05  0.58 
Marshall Islands   0.07  0.25 
Micronesia  0.75  0.76 
Nauru  0.58  1.17 
Palau  0.41  1.13 
Samoa  0.22  0.65 
Solomon Islands  0.11  1.34 
Tuvalu   0.16  0.20 
 
In total, then, in terms of the independent variables Bahamas, Dominica, Micronesia, Nauru, 
Palau, St Lucia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Solomon Islands, and Trinidad & Tobago stand out as 
cases of domination/fragmentation, and are therefore expected to manoeuvre rigid amendment, 
i.e. three-quarters majorities. Other countries are expected to have less rigid amendment forms. 
The Dependent Variable 
The distribution of countries on amendment categories is based on a consultation of relevant 
passages in the constitutions of the countries concerned. However, the classifications involve 
more than simply reading documents. A particular difficulty in amendment studies follows 
from  the  fact  that  several  countries  apply  parallel  but  different  methods,  the  amendment 
threshold being higher for certain constitutional provisions than for certain other provisions 
(Anckar & Karvonen, 2002: 12-13). Since the difference is usually between degrees of rigidity, 
and since this research is precisely about the choice of rigidity thresholds, this multiple choice 
problem needs to be solved. Following a suggestion by Lijphart (1999: 221), the classification 
of these elusive cases is guided here by a simple but certainly reasonable principle, which 
states that the most rigorous requirement counts, except when evident that the requirement is 
valid for some very specific article or purpose only. For instance, in Bahamas, amendment of 
several  constitutional  provisions  requires  the  support  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the 
House.  For  several  other  items,  however,  which  include  regulations  of  citizenship,  the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, the composition and powers of Parliament, 
restrictions  on  the  powers  of  the  Senate,  the  summoning,  prorogation  and  dissolution  of 
Parliament, and the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, the requirement is for a three-
fourths majority and a majority of votes in a following referendum (Constitution, Article 54). 
The  above  list  is  impressive  enough  in  terms  of  quantity  as  well  as  quality  to  justify  the 
classification of Bahamas in the three-quarters category. On the basis of similar considerations                                                          Constitutional Amendments in Small Island Democracies 
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the  three  Caribbean  cases  of  Dominica,  St  Lucia  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago  are  likewise 
included  in  this  same  category:  they  all  apply  methods  that  much  resemble  the  Bahamas 
pattern. In Trinidad and Tobago amendment requires a three-quarters majority in the House of 
Representatives and a two-thirds majority in the Senate. 
Among states with rigid methods are also the two Pacific cases of Micronesia and Palau, both 
of which operate constitutional change on a referendum basis, which involves a three-quarters 
requirement.  Diminutive  size  notwithstanding,  the  two  countries  are  federal  in  structure 
(Anckar, 2003), and the requirements therefore naturally involve a state level. In Palau the 
amendment requirement is for a majority of the votes cast and for a majority of the votes cast 
in  each  of  three  quarters  of  the  states  (Constitution,  Article  XIV:2);  in  Micronesia  the 
requirement  is  for  three-quarters  of  the  votes  cast  in  each  of  three  quarters  of  the  states 
(Constitution, Article XIV).  Of the other Pacific countries, Solomon Islands likewise qualifies, 
as the three-quarters threshold is applied to amendments of a large set of important provisions, 
dealing, for instance, with constitutional alteration, legislation and procedure in Parliament, 
electoral constituencies, establishment, composition and membership of Parliament, and others 
(Constitution, section 62).  Finally, there are in the rigidity group two African cases, Mauritius 
and Sao Tomé and Príncipe. In Mauritius, all constitutional amendments require the approval 
of three-quarters of the deputies; the threshold was, by the way, high enough to impede the 
introduction in 1990 of legislation to make Mauritius a republic (Bowman, 1991: 98-99). In 
Sao Tomé, the rigidity requirement is rather unique in form, as the National Assembly may 
amend the constitution with a three-quarters vote to propose and a two-thirds vote to approve 
(Lee, 1999: 959). 
In terms of the dependent variable, then, Bahamas, Dominica, Mauritius, Micronesia, Palau, St 
Lucia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Solomon Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago stand out as cases 
which apply a three-quarters threshold, whereas the twelve other countries  have less rigid 
amendment  forms.  In  fact,  these  twelve  countries  all  apply  the  two-thirds  threshold 
requirement, which is, in some cases like Grenada, Marshall Islands, Nauru, St Kitts-Nevis, 
and St Vincent and the Grenadines linked for some specific provisions to a referendum stage.  
Findings and Comments 
For the guiding assumptions of this study to be verified, a pattern of co-variation must emerge. 
The implication of this co-variation is that countries that have experienced a dominant party 
system or have otherwise experienced a dominance-sensitive political or social context may be 
expected to introduce a rigid three-fourths amendment threshold, whereas countries with less 
dominant party systems or a smaller extent of fragmentation may be expected to make use of 
less  rigid  amendment  arrangements.  Table  2  investigates  for  each  of  the  21  states  in  this 
research if the expectation is true or false, and Table 3 reports the same data in a comprised and 
more accessible form, i.e. in the form of a four-fold table. 
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Table 2: Dominance/Fragmentation and Amendment Rigidity in 21 Small Island States. 
  Dominance/Fragmentation?  Three-fourths Threshold? 
Antigua-Barbuda  No  No 
Bahamas  Yes  Yes 
Barbados  No  No 
Dominica  Yes  Yes 
Fiji  No  No 
Grenada  No  No 
Jamaica  No  No 
Kiribati  No  No 
Marshall Islands  No  No 
Mauritius   No  Yes 
Micronesia  Yes  Yes 
Nauru  Yes  No 
Palau  Yes  Yes 
St Kitts-Nevis  No  No 
St Lucia  Yes  Yes 
St Vincent & Grenadines  No  No 
Samoa  No  No 
Sao Tomé and Príncipe  Yes  Yes 
Solomon Islands  Yes  Yes 
Trinidad and Tobago  Yes  Yes 
Tuvalu  No  No 
 
Table 3: Dominance/Fragmentation and Amendment Rigidity in 21 Small Island States:  
A Summary of Co-Variations. 
               Three-fourths Threshold? 
                Yes             No 
Dominance/ 
Fragmentation? 
Yes  8  1 
No                1             11 
 
As evident from an examination of the tables, a pattern of co-variation does indeed exist. The 
findings are in fact even surprisingly clear-cut and unequivocal. One expectation is that nine 
cases have established rigid amendment demands in the form of three-fourths thresholds; in 
eight cases out of nine, this expectation is verified. Or, in other words, whenever the triggering 
factors are at hand, rigid amendment follows. The only exception to this rule is fragmented 
Nauru, who has refrained from introducing a three-fourths threshold - it is certainly worth 
noting that the available fragmentation figures of Nauru are heavily influenced by the existence 
in the country before and after independence of a large amount of overseas contract officers 
and  laborers  (Reilly  &  Gratshew,  2001:  701).  On  the  other  hand,  the  expectation  is  that 
countries which have not in their constitution-building phases experienced marked dominance                                                          Constitutional Amendments in Small Island Democracies 
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or high fragmentation will opt for less rigid amendment in the form of a two-thirds threshold or 
less. In eleven cases out of twelve, this expectation is valid: whenever the triggering factors are 
not at hand, moderate amendment follows. The only exception to this rule is Mauritius, which 
is among the countries that maintain a three-fourths rigidity threshold – the observations that 
the  multiparty  system  of  the  country  “is  in  constant  turmoil”  and  demonstrates  “an  ever-
shifting  pattern  of  consolidation,  fragmentation  and  reassembly”  (Meyer,  1999:  728)  may 
provide a key to understanding why rigidity has been regarded a worthwhile constitutional 
tool. 
From the above findings, three general reflections follow: 
(1) Implicitly at least, the field of island studies embraces and cultivates the belief that island 
states  and  particularly  small  island  states  are  different  from  other  states  and  are  therefore 
worthy  of  investigation.  The  doctrine  certainly  appears  justified  and  reasonable;  relevant 
theoretical  literature  suggests,  for  instance,  that  small  size  carries  a  variety  of  specific 
consequences  for  political  life  (Dahl  &  Tufte,  1973:  13-15),  that  islands  are  “special  and 
different,  unlike  continental  areas  in  their  societal,  cultural  and  psychological  makeup” 
(Lowenthal, 1992: 19), and that islands do more than merely reproduce on a manageable scale 
the dynamics and processes that exist elsewhere (Baldacchino, 2004: 278).  However, from the 
fact that small islands are different from others does not follow that small islands are always 
internally similar - Royle suggests in his review of island life and island studies that “every 
island is impacted in some way by the range of insular constraints, but differing in degree 
depending  upon  local  circumstances”  (2001:  210).  Indeed,  this  study  has  detected  local 
circumstances-based differences in degree in terms of amendment behaviour. Regional and 
cultural  proximity  notwithstanding,  the  differences  are  there:  Bahamas  is  different  from 
Barbados, St Lucia is different from St Vincent, Solomon Islands are different from Samoa, 
Micronesia is different from Marshall Islands. 
And still: the differences notwithstanding, elements of similarity remain. The findings testify to 
the capability and inclination of small island communities to act from rationality frameworks 
and premises, and this is true of Barbados as well as Bahamas, St Vincent as well as St Lucia, 
Samoa as well as Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands as well as Micronesia. Rigid amendment 
springs  almost  by  necessity  from  certain  political  and  social  constellations;  when  these 
constellations are absent or obviously weaker, they release moderate amendment at best - in 
short,  rationality  breeds  rigidity  when  necessary  and  less-than-rigidity  when  less-than-
necessary. The essence of this research, then, is a conceptualization that rejects any image of 
small islands as feeble and weak-willed entities, which drift about in landscapes of political 
diffusion and imitation and allow similarities in size and islandness to sweep over rational 
consideration. Instead, verifying the Lijphart hypothesis that inspired this research, the findings 
promote an image of small islands as thoughtful and purposeful political actors that design 
their political institutions to reflect their particular needs.  
(2)  However,  the  conclusion  that  the  small  island  states  have  introduced  rigid  amendment 
procedures according to a rational choice pattern does not exclude other possible constitutional 
choices and remains therefore somewhat vague.  Actually, alternative techniques would in like 
manner verify the theory, and it remains a pertinent question why some political systems, when 
confronting  negative  consequences  of  a  plural  electoral  system,  have  resorted  to  rigid 
amendment clauses instead of simply opting for another electoral system. Indeed, if a plural D. Anckar 
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system can be expected to carry in its wake an unwished dominance, why not change the 
system rather than preserving the defective system and introducing a corrective that builds on 
extreme  rigidity?  One  possible  answer  to  this  question  emphasizes  that  electoral  systems, 
besides having differing technical qualities, differ also in their views of political representation, 
political  accountability  and  political  productivity  (e.g.  Farrell,  2001;  Lundell,  2005).  The 
preservation  of  a  particular  system,  its  weaknesses  notwithstanding,  may  simply  be  the 
consequence of a belief that the system embraces other and good qualities that compensate for 
the weaknesses. When and if this is the case, dispatching an otherwise good and functional 
system only because it has one questionable quality becomes tantamount to throwing the baby 
out with the bath-water. Or, to refer again to the vocabulary of Laponce and Saint-Jacques: not 
only  are  institutions  “problem-solvers”,  they  are  also  “problem-creators”  (1997:  233),  this 
meaning that the dissociation from one electoral institution may solve some problems but also 
creates new ones. When this is the case, a balance must be attained, and the combination of 
plurality and rigidity probably follows from this insight. 
(3) The finding in this research is that particular circumstances have manufactured particular 
institutional arrangements. Therefore, a harmony appears to exist between cause and effect. 
However, much in the nature of things, this harmony may be to some extent infirm. The causes 
which produce an effect are not static, but may change; when this happens it is not a matter of 
course that the effects will change as well. It may be the case that the arrangements become 
antiquated in the sense that they prevail although they are not any longer necessary (Anckar, 
1998: 376-377). For instance, and as evident from recent election outcomes, the party system 
of Bahamas is no longer dominant in nature; still, the three-fourths threshold arrangement 
prevails. Overall, there is very little evidence in the available amendment materials to suggest 
that  amendment  provisions  in  democracies  have  been  mitigated  or  reinforced  over  time 
(Anckar & Karvonen, 2002). Various factors may in separate cases promote such immobility. 
For one thing, processes of law-making and constitution-building often confront mechanisms 
of inertia, which are difficult to avoid and to manage. Furthermore, institutions may become 
and act as protective means, which are difficult to remove. When and if some circumstances 
have  motivated  a  high  amendment  threshold,  and  when  and  if  these  circumstances  later 
disappear, the rigidity that is embedded in the amendment threshold becomes its own prisoner. 
This  is  indeed  one  of  the  many  paradoxes  of  constitutional  politics.  Rigidity  is  no  longer 
necessary, but stands in itself in the way for its removal. Or, in other words: if there is in a 
constitution  a  provision  that  requires  a  high  amendment  threshold,  this  provision  may  be 
mitigated or brought down only when and if it is honoured. 
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